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Abstract 
National registries of toxic chemical emissions and facilities are increasingly used to raise public awareness of 
potential health hazards in local areas, but an unintended consequence may be the offshoring of production to less 
regulated countries. Using disaggregated U.S. trade data, this study examines the impact of registry listing on 
subsequent bilateral trade flows. Estimates from a difference-in-differences model indicate a significant shift toward 
imports from poorer countries following registry listing. Assuming that environmental protection is a normal good, 
this result suggests the emergence of pollution havens due to more stringent U.S. environmental regulation. 
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1. Introduction 
 Do changes in environmental regulation affect where pollution-intensive goods are produced?  Differences 
in environmental policy coupled with trade liberalization may lead to the emergence of pollution havens, with 
polluting activity relocating to areas with less stringent regulation (Jaffe et al 1995, Copeland and Taylor 2004, 
Brunnermeier and Levinson 2004, Taylor 2004). Less clear is whether changes to environmental regulation itself 
have a similar impact on trade patterns, with production moving off-shore in response to mandated restrictions, 
heightened scrutiny, and financial considerations.  
 This paper examines American trade in toxic chemicals, specifically those designated as toxic by the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency’s Toxics Release Inventory (TRI) program.  Following the 1984 industrial 
accident at a Union Carbide plant in Bhopal, India that killed nearly four thousand people within days and poisoned 
an estimated half a million in the following years, the United States Congress passed the Emergency Planning and 
Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA) two years later (Broughton 2005).  The act required domestic industrial 
facilities to report to TRI the quantity of releases and transfers of certain toxic chemicals.  These data are made 
available to the public under the premise that this information creates incentives for companies to improve their 
chemical management and reduce toxic releases.  TRI data collection began in 1988 with 332 chemicals listed as 
toxic and has increased coverage to the current 683 chemicals and chemical categories.2  
This study examines whether the implementation of the toxic chemicals registry program affects trade flows, 
and if so, how. While the intuition behind this question is straightforward in that increased domestic regulation in a 
globalized market can lead to increased imports as substitutes for domestic output, identifying a causal relationship 
from actual trade patterns is much less so. This owes to difficulties in mapping between regulation and economic 
activity, which are usually measured differently, and isolating the regulatory effect from other confounding factors 
like location- or time-specific trends.  
Besides seeing whether trade patterns change, there is the narrower issue of whether toxic chemical imports 
are disproportionately sourced from less regulated jurisdictions, a phenomenon commonly known as the pollution 
haven hypothesis. This issue is controversial in part because it is not obvious that poorer countries, given their factor 
endowments, would have a comparative advantage in producing capital intensive goods like chemicals despite the 
common perception that such countries are more likely to host dirty industries given lax environmental standards. 
                                                
2 http://www2.epa.gov/toxics-release-inventory-tri-program/tri-listed-chemicals 
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Furthermore, environmental regulation may induce technological improvements to domestic manufacturers and 
allow them to produce more efficiently, thus mitigating adverse impacts from increased costs and scrutiny. 
To analyze the trade of TRI chemicals over the past two decades, this paper uses bilateral trade data derived 
from records collected by U.S. Customs and Border Protection and processed by the Foreign Trade Division of the 
U.S. Census Bureau.  These data are disaggregated at the Harmonized Schedule ten-digit level and comprise all 
trade in chemicals between the years 1989 and 2006 for 180 trade partners. The highly detailed nature of these data 
provide a methodological advantage in that, unlike existing studies of trans-national pollution havens, economy 
activity is observed at the commodity level instead of industry or subsector and thus corresponds to the individual 
chemicals listed on the TRI. This mitigates concerns regarding the composition of an industry’s output, some of 
which may be pollution-intensive and subject to regulation while others are not. 
Commodity disaggregation also allows comparison of the listed chemicals to those not subject to regulatory 
change, which can be used to control for pre-existing trends and comparability between chemicals. The analysis uses 
a difference-in-differences least squares regression model to identify an average treatment effect on imports before 
and after a chemical is listed on TRI, with the identification strategy further sharpened by variation across a panel of 
chemicals and different years of registry listing. Differences among trade partners, such as distance, trade barriers, 
and regulatory stringency, are accounted for by direct measures of shipping costs, paid duties, and per capita income, 
respectively. 
The results from the regression model indicate that overall imports of chemicals listed on TRI do not 
significantly change compared to all other chemical imports; however, they are disproportionately sourced from 
poorer countries after listing. At the same time, I find a statistically significant fall in exports of listed chemicals, 
which may proxy for domestic output, thus suggesting that the TRI program may increase foreign production among 
developing economies at the expense of domestic manufacturers. In other words, this points to the creation of 
pollution havens from environmental regulation.  
The remainder of the paper is outlined as follows. Section 2 reviews existing research relating to trade and 
environmental regulation as well as the historical background of the TRI program. Section 3 describes the 
hypotheses, data, and empirical framework used for analysis. Section 4 presents the results, and section 5 concludes 
with a discussion of the findings. 
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2. Existing Scholarship and the Toxics Release Inventory 
There is an extensive and growing literature on the relationship between trade and the environment, with a 
number of possible impacts. Increased trade has the potential to worsen environmental quality if the general scale of 
industrial activity also rises commensurate with economic growth; this is known as the scale effect (Antweiler et al 
2001, Grossman and Krueger 1993). Over time, however, an economy's sectoral composition may change as the 
country exploits its comparative advantage; thus, those with greater relative endowments of capital will produce 
more capital-intensive goods, so depending on the pollution intensity of production overall pollution levels may rise 
or fall (Jaffe et al 1995). Regulation plays a role if environmental quality is a normal good, so as an economy 
becomes wealthier, public demand for clean air and water increases and the government responds with increasingly 
stringent controls on polluting activities, at which point firms may adopt cleaner production technologies, substitute 
away from more toxic inputs, or use pollution abatement equipment (Wheeler 2002). In early stages of development 
the converse may hold, with pollution increasing as economies shift away from agarian and labor-intensive 
production to more industrial, capital-intensive activities. 
Numerous studies have examined whether this inverse-U relationship between per capita income and 
pollution, known as the environmental Kuznets curve (EKC), holds across a variety of pollutants and regions. In 
their study of the possible effects of NAFTA on Mexico and the United States, Grossman and Krueger (1993) find 
that Mexico at the time was at a level of per capita income where further increases in income would likely lead to 
increased demand for environmental protection.  In addition, they find that freer trade would likely reinforce 
Mexico's comparative advantage in labor intensive manufacturing, which tends to be less pollution intensive. As a 
result, they conclude that increased trade may improve the Mexican environment as a whole, in contrast to the 
concerns of environmental groups at the time.  Similarly, Antweiler et al (2001) model and estimate the scale, 
composition, and technique effects of international trade on sulfur dioxide concentrations and find that free trade 
would improve global environmental quality. Looking at seven different pollutants and their environmental 
outcomes, Frankel and Rose (2005) find that trade is beneficial to the environment on a few measures, has no effect 
on others, and potentially has a detrimental effect on one (carbon dioxide). 
Other scholarship has been more critical and nuanced, with Hettige et al (2000) noting the lack of 
improvement in industrial water pollution for countries with middle income status or higher, although pollution 
intensity as a share of output declines with increased income. Stern (2004) finds that developing countries may 
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adopt higher regulatory standards faster than wealthier ones, while Birdsall and Wheeler (1993) find that the EKC 
holds for more protectionist countries and depends on the period of analysis, with lower pollution intensity in the 
1980s than the previous decade. On the issue of the dynamic interaction between regulation and cleaner technology, 
Porter and van der Linde (1995) suggest that higher standards may induce firms to undertake greater innovation to 
offset the costs of compliance, leading to absolute advantages over firms in countries with weaker policies. 
Costantini and Crespi (2008) find support for the Porter hypothesis in their study of the energy sector, using a 
gravity model to show regulation leads to an increase in the export of environmental technologies from European 
Union countries. Similarly, in a study of five different manufacturing sectors, Costantini and Mazzanti (2012) show 
that environmental policies may increase green exports through more efficient production processes. 
The variation in findings may owe to the different levels of aggregation and measures used in the analyses. 
For example, the effect on trade from environmental regulation as proxied by expenditures on pollution abatement 
depend on whether the unit of analysis is at the industry, county, or facility level (eg, Kalt 1988, Tobey 1990, 
Grossman and Krueger 1993, Becker and Henderson 2000, Ederington and Minier 2003, Levinson and Taylor 2008). 
Another form of regulation, pollution release and transfer registries (PRTRs), varies in coverage of chemicals and 
hazardous waste materials across national regimes and is used mainly by the mostly wealthy OECD countries. The 
non-comparability across countries and selection bias in participants make assessing the efficacy of PRTRs difficult, 
with some studies indicating little or no effect on industrial emissions or changes in trade between developing and 
developed economies (Hibiki and Managi 2010, Kerret and Gray 2007, Thomas and Fannin 2011). Notwithstanding 
the issue of trans-national waste shipping, many PRTRs cover materials used as production inputs and were 
motivated by domestic concerns with minimal regard to potential trade consequences. 
The U.S. Toxics Release Inventory, which was the world's first national PRTR, illustrates this point. On 3 
December 1984, over 40 tons of methyl isocyanate gas leaked from a Union Carbide plant in Bhopal, India, killing 
thousands within days and affecting hundreds of thousands in the years since. Shortly after, in January 1985, the 
EPA announced that 28 leaks of methyl isocyanate had occurred in the previous five years at a similar Union 
Carbide plant in Institute, West Virginia, and on 11 August 1985, that same plant experienced a chemical release 
that led to the hospitalization of 135 workers and nearby residents. These events are cited as being among the 
primary motivations for the federal Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA), which was 
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signed into law in October 1986.3 
The EPCRA instituted four new reporting requirements for facilities within the United States that use, 
produce, store, or release certain specified chemicals.  Among the four, EPCRA Section 313 requires affected 
facilities to submit to the EPA and the relevant state office annual reports of chemicals released into the environment 
or transferred off-site.  The information is then compiled and made available to the public in the Toxics Release 
Inventory (TRI), with the first year of data released in June 1989. Facilities are required by law to report to TRI their 
toxic releases and transfers if the facility meets certain conditions.  First, the facility must have 10 or more full-time 
equivalent employees.  Second, the facility must be classified as a manufacturing facility (SIC 20-39) or be engaged 
in one of a number of non-manufacturing activities, with reporting extended to federal plants regardless of industry 
classification starting in 1993. Finally, the facility must manufacture, import, process, or otherwise use any of the 
listed chemicals in amounts greater than the threshold quantities. For most of the chemicals covered by TRI, the 
critical annual thresholds are 25,000 pounds for the manufacture, import, or processing of a chemical, and 10,000 
pounds for the mere use of a chemical, with over 20,000 facilities reporting on average per year.  
At TRI’s inception, 332 chemicals and chemical categories were subject to reporting.  Through the years, 
chemicals have been added and deleted from the list with the current year covering 683 chemical entities. Besides 
basic information about the facility itself, for each of these chemicals meeting any of the above thresholds the 
facility is required to report: how the chemical is used at the facility; the maximum amount of the chemical at the 
facility at any one time during the year; releases in pounds of the chemical to the environment; transfers of the 
chemical to off-site locations (e.g., disposal, treatment and recycling facilities); on-site waste treatment methods 
related to the chemical and their efficiency; source reduction and recycling activities related to the chemical. This 
information is disseminated to the public via the EPA's TRI online database and other websites as well as local and 
national meetings held annually following the release of the latest year's statistics. 
The basic premise behind TRI is that making this information publicly available creates incentives for 
companies to improve their chemical management and reduce toxic releases.  The mechanism that is chiefly cited is 
community pressure on local facilities, although empirical research tends to focus on how consumers and investors 
influence companies through market signals. For instance, Hamilton (1995) finds that publicly-traded firms 
reporting to TRI experienced abnormal negative stock returns on the day following the release of the very first TRI 
                                                
3 http://www.epa.gov/tri/ 
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data in June 1989. The effect was more pronounced for companies reporting a greater number of TRI chemicals and 
less for those with known Superfund sites, which are locations contaminated by hazardous substances and overseen 
by federal authorities. Both Konar and Cohen (1997) and Khanna et al (1998) find that, on average, a publicly-
traded firm reporting to TRI experiences negative stock returns in the days following media coverage of a 
company's TRI emissions. In contrast, Hibiki and Managi (2010) find that the Japanese equivalent to the TRI 
program does not appear to penalize companies for the risk of toxic chemical releases, although their investment in 
pollution abatement increases. That said, the U.S. TRI program is often held up as a successful market-based 
solution that requires only reporting, not mandatory limits, and in terms of reported emissions the aggregate volume 
of releases and disposal for covered chemicals has fallen steadily in most years since the program began and as 
chemicals are added. 
Interpreting these downward trends as a causal impact of regulation, however, may be problematic for a 
number of reasons. First, facilities are not required to report emissions when the chemicals are not listed, making it 
impossible to compare pre- and post-listing trends based on emissions alone. This problem of identification is 
exacerbated by the non-disclosure of firm production data to the public (and the EPA provides only broad ranges of 
values), as it is not obvious that changes in emission levels owe to changes in levels of domestic production, 
improved emissions capture, false reporting, gaming of reporting thresholds, overlapping regulation, or a 
combination of these. A number of studies have found that facilities under-report their toxic releases or limit 
emissions to just below the thresholds that would trigger a reporting requirement, which is known as threshold 
regarding (Bennear 2008, Koehler and Spengler 2007).  Other studies have suggested that declines might be due to 
regulation of some of these chemicals under other federal and state programs or as a side-benefit of the regulation 
and abatement of non-toxic pollutants such as those covered under the Clean Air Act (Bui 2005, Koehler and 
Spengler 2007).  
Even assuming that reduced emissions of listed chemicals indeed represent better management of their usage 
and transfer and possibly lower overall domestic production, the international dimension of increased regulation, 
specifically the substitution of imported chemicals, remains unaddressed. Furthermore, per the Porter hypothesis, 
separately examining the import and export flows of these chemicals may provide insight into the dynamic behavior 
of domestically regulated firms, which previous research suggests may change in their production efficiency 
(Costantini and Mazzanti 2012). This paper investigates the effect of TRI listing on a chemical's trade flows to see if 
 8 
production is being offshored, whether income differences with trade partners are a contributing factor, and if the net 
effect of regulation has had an adverse impact on imports and exports across all affected chemicals. 
 
3. Research Design: Data and Methodology 
The main hypotheses tested in the analysis are: 1) TRI listing is associated with increased gross imports; and 
2) TRI listing increases the share of imports from poorer countries. Similar, but opposite effects should be observed 
in the export data, although if the Porter hypothesis applies, exports may increase with regulation as firms improve 
their production processes. Following Copeland and Taylor (1995), these possible outcomes are respectively known 
as the pollution haven effect and the pollution haven hypothesis, or more intuitively the weak and strong forms of 
the pollution haven phenomenon. The weak form hypothesizes that an increase in a country’s regulatory stringency 
will, at the margin, result in a relocation of pollution-intensive industrial activity and be observed in increased 
imports and/or lower exports. The strong form hypothesizes that a disproportionate share of polluting-intensive 
production will be sourced from less regulated countries, which is proxied by income level per the environmental 
Kuznets curve. This effect may be mitigated by factor endowments and the capital intensity of the goods produced 
(Antweiler et al 2001). 
Both questions are amenable to using detailed bilateral trade data and a difference-in-differences approach, 
which can be used to compare changes to import and export values for individual chemicals both prior and 
following TRI listing. This paper focuses on a panel of toxic chemicals that were added to the TRI list between the 
years 1989 and 2006 using publicly accessible data collected by the U.S. Census Bureau and disseminated by the 
National Bureau of Economic Research and the Center for International Data.4 By looking at changes to the TRI list, 
one can identify the direct treatment effect of TRI regulation, which is then compared to trade patterns of other 
chemicals unaffected by a change to their TRI status. Unlike the observed emissions data provided by TRI, which 
are available only when chemicals are listed, these trade data allow one to differentiate a policy effect from a general 
rise in trade or other unobserved or idiosyncratic factors. Furthermore, since the United States trades chemicals with 
countries that vary in income levels and regulatory stringency, controlling for these can provide evidence on whether 
increased domestic environmental protection has led to the creation of offshore pollution havens. 
The data used in this study come from U.S. Customs and Border Protection administrative records, which are 
                                                
4 http://cid.econ.ucdavis.edu/usix.html 
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processed by the Foreign Trade Division (FTD) of the U.S. Census Bureau and then aggregated by trade partner and 
commodity. These annual series include all bilateral merchandise imports and exports at the ten-digit Harmonized 
Schedule (HS) classification system and contain information on current dollar value and for imports, their shipping 
and insurance costs and duties paid. Since some of the identified chemicals are imported but not exported by the 
U.S., results for imports and exports are separately reported. Import values include cost, insurance, and freight (CIF) 
prior to leaving foreign ports and exports are valued at the free alongside ship (FAS) value, which includes all 
transport and insurance charges incurred within the United States.5 Trade in chemicals falls under the two-digit HS 
codes of 28 or 29, with those chemicals not identified by TRI listing making up the comparison group as described 
below. 
To identify overlap between traded HS commodities and TRI listed chemicals, I match exact chemical names 
or their molecular equivalent between both databases. Of the current 683 TRI chemicals, over 200 were added or 
dropped between 1989 and 2006, with major changes taking place in the years 1994, 1995, and 2000.6 Within this 
period, there are exact name matches for 28 chemicals added to the registry in the import schedule, and of these 11 
in the export schedule. The difference between the schedule owes to the more detailed information needed to assess 
tariffs for imports, although the commodity codes are mostly consistent between the two schedules. Furthermore, the 
overall number is limited primarily because many HS classifications, while highly detailed compared to industry 
classifications, nevertheless encompass multiple chemicals with at least one not on the TRI registry. The advantage 
to using exact name matches is that they allow for a clean comparison between treatment (TRI listing additions) and 
control (unaffected chemicals) groups, with the findings providing as a conservative estimate of the treatment effect. 
This direct mapping between the level of regulation and the observed outcome strengthens the identification of TRI's 
impact and to the author’s knowledge no existing study has used a similar approach with these data sources.  
The panel of TRI-added chemicals range from household products (e.g., cleaning fluids) to intermediates in 
or byproducts of industrial manufacturing (e.g., solvents, refrigerants); they also vary in their economic value, 
environmental hazard, and toxicity levels.7 For example, chlorodifluoromethane (aka, HCFC-22) is the most widely 
used chemical in the panel, although the chemical category of vanadium compounds has by far the most pounds of 
emissions. Formic acid is a chemical byproduct in the production of other chemicals like acetic acid and can be 
                                                
5 http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/guide/index.html 
6 http://www2.epa.gov/toxics-release-inventory-tri-program/changes-tri-list-toxic-chemicals 
7 For ranking of chemicals by toxicity, see http://scorecard.goodguide.com/env-releases/def/tep_gen.html.  
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found naturally in some insect venom. The data appendix provides more detail about these chemicals, such as their 
health hazard rating and major trade partners over the period. 
To test the hypotheses that chemicals added to the TRI list lead to increased imports and that a 
disproportionate share is sourced from less regulated countries, this paper estimates the following reduced form 
fixed effects regression model: 
 yijt = β0 + β1⋅x1it + β2⋅x2jt + β3⋅x1t⋅x2t + β4⋅x4i,jt + β5⋅x5ijt + εit, where 
 yijt = gross trade value for chemical i from trade partner j in year t 
 x1it = TRI listing status for chemical i in year t 
 x2jt = per capita income for trade partner j in year t 
 x4jt = control variables for trade partner j in year t 
 x5ijt = control variables for chemical i and trade partner j in year t 
 εijt = error term 
Since the dataset comprises all bilateral trade for the U.S., I construct a balanced panel for each chemical-
trade partner pair, including zero values for years in which trade for a chemical from a country does not occur.  The 
main variables of interest are the policy intervention variable x1it and its interaction with trade partner per capita 
income x2jt. The cumulative effect of these two variables' coefficients can be interpreted as indicating whether the 
weak form of the pollution haven phenomenon obtains (i.e., the net TRI effect), while the coefficient on the 
interaction variable indicates whether the share of trade among partners changes following TRI listing.  
Also included are a number of time varying control variables by country x4jt (i.e., net terms of trade, 
national income level) and by country-chemical x5ijt (i.e., import transit costs, duties) that may affect trade flows 
separate from environmental policies. Country-level statistics were obtained from the World Bank Group's World 
Development Indicators online database.8 I include an additional country and time varying indicator variable for 
OECD membership to proxy for institutional similarities and participation in selective multilateral treaties, including 
the 1992 Basel Convention that restricts the export of hazardous wastes to non-members (Thomas and Fannin 
2011).9 All specifications include fixed effects for trade partner, year, and ten-digit HS chemical with robust 
standard errors reported in the tables.  
                                                
8 http://go.worldbank.org/3SGLDH5V10.   
9 A list of OECD member countries and their accession dates can be found at http://www.oecd.org. 
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Causal interpretations from difference-in-differences estimation are valid conditional on the ex ante 
comparability of the treatment and control groups prior to treatment as well as the exogeneity of the treatment on the 
observed outcome. For the control group of unaffected chemicals, the analysis uses all other traded chemicals either 
aggregated into a single series of trade values or as a panel of individual chemicals based on ten-digit commodity 
code. Both specifications include only chemicals with time consistent commodity codes in the period 1989 to 2006 
to mitigate panel heterogeneity. To verify comparability between treatment and control groups, I run the full model 
specification on each cohort of added chemicals in the years prior to TRI listing (e.g., 1989 to 1993 for chemicals 
added in 1994). Cohorts that exhibit statistically significant differences in the pre-treatment period based on future 
TRI listing are excluded from the main analysis for both pre- and post-treatment years. As for exogeneity of 
treatment, no documentation from the U.S. EPA indicates foreign trade as a consideration in the decision to add 
chemicals; this is likely due to agency's jurisdiction being limited to American borders and the localized impact 
from the hazards of emissions.  
 
4. Results and Robustness Checks 
While the EPA reports that overall emissions for TRI chemicals have decreased since their listing, the 
trends for individual chemicals in the panel vary considerably. Table 1 lists the traded chemicals added to TRI 
between 1989 and 2006 and their average annual reported emissions and gross import values, with the latter 
separated for years before and after TRI listing. As the table shows, the majority of the chemicals had decreasing 
emissions during the years they were listed on TRI, including the three chemicals with the largest absolute emissions, 
corroborating the EPA's claims. Over the same period, however, most of these also had positive gross import growth 
and in the case of the largest chemical emissions, vanadium compounds, much higher growth compared to years 
when the chemical group was unlisted. 
[Table 1] 
  To more robustly account for differences between chemicals and secular trends affecting trade, results 
from the difference-in-differences regression model are provided in the remaining tables. Tables 2 and 3 report 
estimates for the panel of TRI-added chemicals compared to the control groups of all other chemicals in aggregate 
or individual series, respectively, with annual gross import value by trade partner as the dependent variable. The first 
three columns in each table show the results from the pre-treatment period to indicate whether there were differences 
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between the treatment and control groups. Across all three cohort groups, none exhibits statistically significant 
differences based on later TRI change, demonstrating the comparability of the two groups. 
[Tables 2 and 3] 
 Results for each cohort and the full panel of chemicals are in the remaining four columns. In both tables, 
the coefficient for the TRI indicator variable (row 1) is positive, but statistically insignificant, while that for trade 
partner per capita income (row 2) is positive and significant. These suggest that on its own TRI listing has little 
effect on import volumes and that listed chemicals are imported more from other wealthy countries over the whole 
period, which may be expected given the capital intensity of chemical manufacturing. However, the interaction of 
the two variables (row 3) is uniformly negative and highly significant, indicating that in the years following listing, 
these chemicals are increasingly sourced from poorer countries. This is true despite a positive and generally 
significant coefficient on OECD membership, which imposes restrictions on the trade of toxic chemicals with non-
member countries.  
To estimate the net TRI treatment effect, I perform a Wald test on the linear combination of the coefficients 
for the TRI listing and its interaction with per capita income variables calculated at the average trade partner income 
level of $14,858 during the period. In the aggregate control group specification (Table 2), the net TRI effect is 
generally negative and significant, indicating a decrease in imports of listed chemicals following their registry 
inclusion. However, when disaggregated by individual chemical in the control group (Table 3), the coefficient is no 
longer statistically significant. Thus, while the estimates across specifications provide support for the strong form of 
the pollution haven phenomenon, i.e., higher share of TRI chemical imports from poorer countries following 
regulation, it is unclear whether there is an overall increase relative to other chemical imports because of listing. 
Since the impact of TRI listing is likely to affect domestic production, which may correspond to the volume 
that is exported, the same regressions are used for gross export values in Tables 4 and 5. Separate analysis of gross 
exports may also provide evidence for or against the Porter hypothesis; that is, if regulation spurs technological 
improvements that increase production efficiency, exports may increase in contrast to predictions based on the 
pollution haven effect, especially given the length of the period of analysis. Note, however, that the number of 
exported chemicals with a TRI listing change are fewer in number than those imported, so the results between the 
two tables are not directly comparable. Furthermore, unlike the results for import values, the cohort of chemicals 
added in the year 2000 differs from both control group specifications during the pre-treatment period (column 3) and 
 13 
thus is excluded from the full panel analysis (column 6).  
[Tables 4 and 5] 
The main specification results differ between the two control groups, with a negative and statistically 
significant coefficient on the net TRI effect for the aggregate series in Table 4, similar with that for imports in Table 
2, but insignificant for the individual chemical panel in Table 5. In both tables of export results, however, the 
interaction of TRI listing and trade partner per capita income is negative and significant, indicating that wealthier 
countries decrease their imports of listed chemicals following registry inclusion. Comparing the results from all four 
tables, one notes that the coefficient for the net TRI effect is negative for both imports and exports and generally 
larger in magnitude for the latter. An interpretation of this is that U.S. production (exports) and use (imports) may 
have decreased in response to TRI listing, with a more pronounced impact on production.  
While the results across cohorts and for the full panel of chemicals indicate that TRI listing is associated with 
a relative increase in the share of imports from poorer trade partners, a potential concern is that their statistical 
significance is due to serial correlation in the time series data, thus creating a downward bias in the standard errors. 
Following Bertrand et al (2004), I check for their robustness by collapsing the years before and after treatment for 
each of the three cohorts into two periods and rerun the regression model. Note that this method is not applicable to 
the full panel of chemicals in a single regression since period (instead of year) fixed effects would overlap. 
[Tables 6 and 7] 
The robustness check results for both imports and exports are given in Tables 6 and 7, respectively, with the 
panel of individual chemicals used as control groups. Pre-treatment estimates are shown in the first three columns 
and the main pre- and post-treatment comparison in the remaining three. For imports, the net effect of TRI listing 
again is negative, but insignificant for all three cohorts, and the interaction of TRI listing with per capita income has 
negative coefficients for chemicals added to TRI in the years 1995 and 2000. Of these, the year 2000 cohort is 
statistically significant and thus consistent with earlier results that include the time series dimension; this cohort also 
includes the group of chemicals responsible for the largest amount of emissions, vanadium compounds. On the other 
hand, the chemicals listed in the year 1994 have a positive and weakly significant coefficient on the interaction term, 
suggesting the strong form of the pollution haven phenomenon may not obtain for those four chemicals. 
For exports, the results have a clearer and more consistent interpretation. While the pre-treatment estimates 
for the 1994 cohort indicate differences between the treatment and control groups, those for the two other years do 
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not. Estimates of their pre- and post-treatment periods show that TRI corresponds to a large and highly significant 
reduction in exports of listed chemicals, which is evidence in support of the pollution havens phenomenon and 
contrary to the Porter hypothesis. Taken together with the import results and the absolute increase in trade of listed 
and unlisted chemicals over the period, the earlier finding of a change in the composition of trade partners (i.e., 
increased sourcing from poorer countries) applies at least to a quarter of the chemicals in the full panel. 
 
5. Discussion and Conclusion 
While declines in reported emissions of TRI chemicals in the years following their listing may indicate that 
TRI is having its intended regulatory effect, the results from this paper's analysis suggest that some of these 
emissions may have relocated abroad, especially to poorer countries with likely lower environmental protection. 
Using a panel of 28 toxic chemicals added to TRI between 1989 and 2006, I find that registry inclusion is associated 
with a shift among trade partners toward those with lower per capita incomes. Unlike earlier studies that analyze the 
pollution haven phenomenon at the industry level, this study utilizes highly disaggregated trade data that allow 
matching the level of regulation to an observed economic activity. These estimates are sharpened not only through 
comparing pre- and post-TRI listing trade activity, but also by exploiting the variation between the TRI chemicals 
themselves, their different listing years, and multiple source and destination countries. Taken together, I find 
evidence supporting the pollution haven phenomenon among regulated chemicals for both imports and exports, even 
with potential efficiency improvements among among domestic producers due to TRI.  
That said, these findings rely on a number of assumptions, in particular that per capita income is a good proxy 
for environmental protection and that trade flows are representative of overall production. To increase the precision 
of the estimates, one can identify changes in environmental protection among all U.S. trade partners such as their 
adoption of programs similar to TRI. However, even with critical assessments of the relationship between income 
and demand for environmental quality, pollution intensive activity does not appear to monotonically increase as 
countries become wealthier, and this paper's results illustrates this with evidence from both imports and exports of 
toxic chemicals. The results are also limited to a narrow set of chemicals with no information about the using or 
producing firms themselves, so it remains unclear what impact the regulation may have had on domestic production 
processes or the sector as a whole. 
The findings can also be refined by using measures of actual output instead of trade flows, which are an 
 15 
imprecise proxy; unfortunately, due to firm confidentiality, such data are not available. In terms of approximating 
total production, however, trade flows are arguably a more representative measure of output compared to reported 
emissions given ongoing improvements to reduce environmental impact while maintaining production levels. 
Technological change along the lines of the Porter hypothesis further underscores this point as differences in 
production techniques between countries with strict or lax regulations may increase over time, so shifts in the 
sourcing of chemicals present unambiguous support for the pollution haven phenomenon. By showing that exports 
of listed chemicals decreases while imports do not, technological upgrading as a response to domestic regulation 
does not appear to be a major factor in explaining trade patterns. 
Besides providing empirical evidence of a trade impact from environmental regulation, the results also 
highlight the utility of cataloging toxic substances and pollution intensive activities and disseminating these statistics 
to the public. Programs like TRI are increasingly adopted internationally, but remain highly variable in coverage and 
at present are mostly found in wealthier countries. One concern is that pollution release and transfer registers 
address a narrow segment of industries and may not identify broader intersectoral changes or cover the range of 
potentially hazardous materials. The counterargument is that many of these products are widely used and thus have 
economy-wide impacts, and since their production is capital-intensive and generally immobile, governments can 
better monitor their activities and adapt reporting requirements to local conditions. This paper demonstrates the 
potential insights that may be gained from combining information collected by these programs with other sources, 
such as trade data, which in turn can aid policymakers gain a better understanding of the efficacy of regulation as 
well as promote coordination in environmental standards. 
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Table 1: Traded chemical additions to TRI, annual averages between 1989-2006 
 
Chemical additions TRI Listing  Listing Years Pre-Listing Years 
  Emissions  
(thou lbs) 
Annual 
change (%) 
Imports 
(thou $) 
Annual 
change (%) 
Imports 
(thou $) 
Annual 
change (%) 
chlorodifluoromethane 1994 8,722.8 -3.8 42,122.8 13.1 8,485.7 19.1 
ethylidene dichloride  32.8 -4.8 31,571.5 2.1 12,560.3 49.9 
formic acid  10,952.7 -1.8 4,742.6 -5.3 8,113.8 1.4 
malonitrile  249.7 -0.5 889.0 0.5 863.9 3.5 
Bendiocarb 1995 0.05 -43.7 520.2 -18.8 4,354.0 -17.0 
bromine  352.6 13.4 1,746.2 4.3 369.2 2.0 
Bromoxynil  0.7 -27.8 4,677.0 -29.5 9,832.4 29.9 
3,3-dichlorobenzidine dihydrochloride  1.7 -8.3 24,645.0 7.0 5,335.9 54.7 
dicyclopentadiene  581.8 -7.0 18,759.3 3.8 6,350.0 -4.3 
N,N-dimethylformamide  2,378.4 -5.3 4,578.2 -20.2 3,681.1 14.4 
dinitrobutyl phenol  8.6 -3.2 196.7 -15.1 20.1 -17.1 
Fenthion  0.0005 -25.2 278.2 -44.6 190.4 -5.9 
fluorine  138.4 0.4 183.9 32.9 11.3 7.7 
alpha-hexachlorocyclohexane  0.001 46.2 2,556.2 -20.6 3,578.3 15.3 
lithium carbonate  287.2 -5.6 20,787.4 7.2 9,653.3 13.3 
methoxone  4.2 -8.9 10,559.8 5.0 5,858.0 -11.3 
monuron1  n/a n/a 14.7 28.7 10,784.1 32.6 
paraquat dichloride  5.8 2.5 291.2 11.5 1,505.3 -51.5 
sodium nitrite  4,690.0 4.5 1,156.5 4.5 1,130.5 -16.2 
tetracycline hydrochloride  3.3 3.8 81,109.3 1.1 57,918.2 6.0 
tetrabromobisphenol A 2000 662.0 -15.7 1,664.3 17.7 584.5 27.1 
vanadium compounds2  59,525.5 -9.2 21,559.4 43.6 6,684.2 8.1 
1 No emissions data were reported to the US EPA during listing period. 
2 Emissions and percent changes are for the vanadium compounds category; traded values based on the following commodities: vanadate, vanadium chloride, 
vanadium chloride oxide, vanadium hydride, vanadium oxide, vanadium pentoxide, and vanadium sulfate. 
Source: US EPA and CID; see text. 
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Table 2: Difference-in-differences results for import values, aggregated series 
 
DV: Import value ($ mil) Pre-treatment Results  Main Results 
TRI listing year cohort 1994 1995 2000  1994 1995 2000 All Years 
TRI listing for chemicals dropped dropped dropped  7.262 
(13.282) 
9.823 
(11.111) 
12.993 
(12.480) 
10.426 
(8.354) 
GDP per capita ($ thou) 1.950 
(1.232) 
1.523 
(0.984) 
5.754 
(4.262) 
 3.781* 
(1.935) 
3.290** 
(1.626) 
3.459* 
(1.796) 
2.827** 
(1.364) 
TRI listing · GDP p.c. ($ thou) 0.034 
(1.606) 
-1.335 
(0.968) 
-6.339 
(3.913) 
 -3.676** 
(1.675) 
-2.841** 
(1.322) 
-2.997** 
(1.403) 
-2.424** 
(1.102) 
GDP ($100 bil) -7.394* 
(4.271) 
-2.296 
(1.391) 
-0.329 
(0.785) 
 0.403 
(1.867) 
-0.254 
(0.857) 
-0.196 
(1.434) 
-0.389 
(0.521) 
Import transport costs ($ mil) 4.137*** 
(1.350) 
5.326*** 
(1.694) 
14.835*** 
(1.572) 
 16.120*** 
(2.498) 
16.247*** 
(2.496) 
16.218*** 
(2.477) 
16.357*** 
(2.487) 
Import duties ($ mil) 21.292*** 
(2.917) 
19.631*** 
(3.222) 
11.711*** 
(3.680) 
 -3.332 
(9.977) 
-3.323 
(9.801) 
-3.339 
(9.873) 
-3.515 
(9.772) 
Terms of trade (year 2000=100) -0.010 
(0.023) 
-0.016 
(0.019) 
0.023 
(0.054) 
 0.283 
(0.195) 
0.259 
(0.171) 
0.287 
(0.198) 
0.209 
(0.135) 
OECD membership dropped 4.919 
(3.950) 
13.934 
(15.753) 
 25.667 
(20.557) 
17.024* 
(9.591) 
18.184 
(17.020) 
11.325* 
(5.846) 
         
Net TRI effect 0.079 
(3.707) 
-4.102 
(2.975) 
-17.796 
(10.985) 
 -26.696** 
(12.840) 
-23.834** 
(10.437) 
-14.443 
(9.418) 
-21.407** 
(8.680) 
         
Treatment / Control groups 4 / 1 16 / 1 8 / 1  4 / 1 16 / 1 8 / 1 28 / 1 
Panel size 91 128 97  224 353 235 504 
Observations 444 759 1,042  2,533 3,852 2.676 5,397 
Within R-squared 0.850 0.854 0.747  0.686 0.684 0.685 0.681 
F-statistic 42.11*** 26.85*** 159.04***  31.20*** 28.32*** 26.39*** 19.08*** 
Significance level: * 10 percent   ** 5 percent   *** 1 percent 
All specifications include trade partner, chemical, and year fixed effects. Control group includes all other chemicals aggregated into a single series by trade 
partner. Treatment group is by individual chemical (ten-digit HS commodity code) and trade partner. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
Source: see text. 
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Table 3: Difference-in-differences results for import values, individual chemical series 
    
DV: Import value ($ thou) Pre-treatment Results  Main Results 
TRI listing year cohort 1994 1995 2000  1994 1995 2000 All Years 
TRI listing for chemicals dropped dropped dropped  225.882 
(278.659) 
301.954 
(327.053) 
558.516 
(376.986) 
368.695* 
(217.810) 
GDP per capita ($ thou) 6.529 
(9.136) 
-0.023 
(7.749) 
5.074 
(26.232) 
 27.674*** 
(8.437) 
27.435*** 
(8.396) 
27.424*** 
(8.431) 
27.166*** 
(8.379) 
TRI listing · GDP p.c. ($ thou) 32.961 
(32.705) 
-17.643 
(55.754) 
-31.373 
(19.895) 
 -67.652*** 
(26.419) 
-26.337** 
(12.043) 
-24.646*** 
(7.463) 
-34.482*** 
(10.024) 
GDP ($100 bil) -7.394* 
(4.271) 
-64.442 
(40.693) 
-11.807 
(13.623) 
 -27.135 
(17.619) 
-25.388 
(17.409) 
-26.762 
(17.509) 
-26.127 
(17.241) 
Import transport costs ($ thou) 6.835*** 
(1.350) 
6.597*** 
(1.314) 
9.349*** 
(1.136) 
 13.401*** 
(1.713) 
13.412*** 
(1.714) 
13.410*** 
(1.715) 
13.406*** 
(1.712) 
Import duties ($ thou) 23.324*** 
(2.962) 
22.444*** 
(3.559) 
11.777*** 
(1.320) 
 13.840*** 
(3.623) 
13.764*** 
(3.656) 
13.845*** 
(3.620) 
13.730*** 
(3.665) 
Terms of trade (year 2000=100) -0.720 
(0.632) 
-0.752 
(0.719) 
-1.034 
(1.212) 
 17.366*** 
(4.424) 
17.218*** 
(4.400) 
17.366*** 
(4.424) 
17.063*** 
(4.359) 
OECD membership dropped 100.401 
(89.942) 
58.299 
(69.547) 
 430.999*** 
(111.781) 
415.809*** 
(110.725) 
422.443*** 
(111.425) 
412.673*** 
(109.543) 
         
Net TRI effect 135.089 
(134.041) 
-76.806 
(242.720) 
-163.043 
(103.395) 
 -776.679** 
(336.479) 
-88.803 
(238.164) 
193.443 
(373.342) 
-143.410 
(182.870) 
         
Treatment / Control groups 4 / 638 16 / 638 8 / 638  4 / 638 16 / 638 8 / 638 28 / 638 
Panel size 4,997 5,034 5,003  14,505 14,634 14,516 14,785 
Observations 24,876 30,067 54,708  156,048 157,367 156,191 158,912 
Within R-squared 0.770 0.738 0.407  0.464 0.464 0.465 0.464 
F-statistic 16.83*** 9.16*** 99.87***  23.78*** 23.94*** 23.84*** 23.93*** 
Significance level: * 10 percent   ** 5 percent   *** 1 percent 
All specifications include trade partner, chemical, and year fixed effects. Control and treatment groups are by individual chemical (ten-digit HS commodity 
code) and trade partner. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
Source: see text. 
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Table 4: Difference-in-differences results for export values, aggregated series 
 
DV: Import value ($ mil) Pre-treatment Results  Main Results 
TRI listing year cohort 1994 1995 2000  1994 1995 1994, 1995 
TRI listing for chemicals dropped dropped dropped  -33.800** 
(16.125) 
-38.647** 
(18.921) 
-28.532* 
(14.646) 
GDP per capita ($ thou) -0.633 
(4.411) 
5.117 
(4.937) 
12.422** 
(4.887) 
 5.364** 
(2.572) 
4.572** 
(2.159) 
4.352** 
(1.924) 
TRI listing · GDP p.c. ($ thou) 0.692 
(5.396) 
-5.967 
(5.131) 
-15.814*** 
(5.124) 
 -6.949*** 
(2.302) 
-5.015*** 
(1.743) 
-4.346*** 
(1.524) 
GDP ($100 bil) 4.086 
(9.663) 
3.904 
(3.210) 
12.385** 
(5.680) 
 17.307* 
(9.582) 
10.594 
(6.439) 
7.060 
(4.549) 
Terms of trade (year 2000=100) 0.013 
(0.026) 
0.009 
(0.027) 
0.018 
(0.079) 
 -0.071 
(0.134) 
-0.063 
(0.121) 
-0.054 
(0.087) 
OECD membership dropped 21.111 
(23.700) 
83.639 
(81.363) 
 172.716 
(125.084) 
103.047 
(78.351) 
72.856 
(56.893) 
        
Net TRI effect 1.632 
(12.725) 
-17.416 
(14.977) 
-49.507*** 
(16.039) 
 -82.954*** 
(25.130) 
-80.979*** 
(26.777) 
-64.640*** 
(21.695) 
        
Treatment / Control groups 3 / 1 6 / 1 2 / 1  3 / 1 6 / 1 9 / 1 
Panel size 183 236 118  364 478 676 
Observations 897 1,387 1,264  4.499 5,869 8,397 
Within R-squared 0.009 0.064 0.200  0.159 0.114 0.086 
F-statistic 1.06 1.53 3.25***  2.46*** 2.04*** 1.58** 
Significance level: * 10 percent   ** 5 percent   *** 1 percent 
All specifications include trade partner, chemical, and year fixed effects. Control group includes all other chemicals aggregated into a single 
series by trade partner. Treatment group is by individual chemical (ten-digit HS commodity code) and trade partner. Robust standard errors 
are in parentheses. 
Source: see text. 
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Table 5: Difference-in-differences results for export values, individual chemical series 
 
DV: Import value ($ thou) Pre-treatment Results  Main Results 
TRI listing year cohort 1994 1995 2000  1994 1995 1994, 1995 
TRI listing for chemicals dropped dropped dropped  166.800 
(223.057) 
-153.534*** 
(51.603) 
-27.746 
(94.539) 
GDP per capita ($ thou) -4.974 
(10.246) 
2.138 
(8.945) 
14.446** 
(6.327) 
 -2.238 
(5.503) 
-2.176 
(5.484) 
-1.913 
(5.465) 
TRI listing · GDP p.c. ($ thou) 624.145 
(466.427) 
-12.701 
(11.054) 
-52.085*** 
(13.793) 
 -0.807 
(21.939) 
-29.357*** 
(6.841) 
-20.636** 
(8.732) 
GDP ($100 bil) 37.579 
(55.537) 
54.418 
(37.493) 
76.517*** 
(13.177) 
 141.256*** 
(23.387) 
139.075*** 
(23.242) 
139.954*** 
(23.124) 
Terms of trade (year 2000=100) 0.264 
(0.298) 
0.302 
(0.318) 
0.742** 
(0.367) 
 -0.978 
(0.828) 
-0.970 
(0.825) 
-0.972 
(0.819) 
OECD membership dropped 324.401*** 
(121.751) 
550.038*** 
(155.352) 
 1335.139*** 
(361.338) 
1328.047*** 
(359.064) 
1316.552*** 
(356.812) 
        
Net TRI effect 1836.420 
(1372.367) 
-39.530 
(34.403) 
-194.334*** 
(51.464) 
 159.415 
(283.629) 
-422.443*** 
(69.977) 
-216.604* 
(114.684) 
        
Treatment / Control groups 3 / 458 6 / 458 2 / 458  3 / 458 6 / 458 9 / 458 
Panel size 14,932 14,985 14,867  29,039 29,153 29,351 
Observations 73,123 88,014 159,650  362,903 364,273 366,801 
Within R-squared 0.002 0.001 0.004  0.007 0.007 0.007 
F-statistic 1.75* 4.47*** 7.46***  8.30*** 8.29*** 8.26*** 
Significance level: * 10 percent   ** 5 percent   *** 1 percent 
All specifications include trade partner, chemical, and year fixed effects. Control and treatment groups are by individual chemical (ten-digit 
HS commodity code) and trade partner. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
Source: see text. 
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Table 6: Serial correlation robustness check for import values, individual chemical series 
 
DV: Import value ($ thou) Pre-treatment Period Results  Two-Period Results 
TRI listing year cohort 1994 1995 2000  1994 1995 2000 
TRI listing for chemicals 48.892 
(851.268) 
74.473 
(825.722) 
317.561 
(737.046) 
 -428.903* 
(223.002) 
479.408 
(433.958) 
1179.365* 
(639.359) 
GDP per capita ($ thou) 19.936 
(35.447) 
16.009 
(27.662) 
4.781 
(10.716) 
 -16.772 
(11.248) 
-11.320 
(12.739) 
-15.101 
(38.056) 
TRI listing · GDP p.c. ($ thou) 3.362 
(72.660) 
-25.209 
(40.164) 
37.008 
(73.874) 
 28.883* 
(15.570) 
-28.748 
(29.015) 
-76.239** 
(35.419) 
GDP ($100 bil) 465.364 
(1244.485) 
394.101 
(1197.655) 
-42.700 
(57.898) 
 -51.954*** 
(19.352) 
-43.837** 
(19.374) 
-34.255 
(25.785) 
Import transport costs ($ thou) 4.131*** 
(0.187) 
5.234*** 
(0.172) 
8.189*** 
(0.163) 
 15.482*** 
(2.983) 
13.391*** 
(2.103) 
13.902*** 
(2.223) 
Import duties ($ thou) 25.027*** 
(0.129) 
25.170*** 
(0.119) 
34.885*** 
(0.249) 
 13.137*** 
(2.730) 
14.554*** 
(2.295) 
21.381** 
(8.747) 
Terms of trade (year 2000=100) 4.392 
(14.084) 
4.083 
(14.692) 
0.235 
(20.764) 
 15.482*** 
(2.983) 
19.334*** 
(3.926) 
41.547*** 
(11.223) 
OECD membership -134.928 
(430.933) 
-75.183 
(358.908) 
-5.154 
(239.366) 
 418.920*** 
(94.512) 
500.267*** 
(102.979) 
1763.141*** 
(562.504) 
        
Net TRI effect 62.816 
(898.493) 
-36.501 
(842.700) 
511.921 
(797.222) 
 -2.409 
(115.611) 
46.847 
(183.017) 
-59.083 
(291.957) 
        
Treatment / Control groups 4 / 638 16 / 638 8 / 638  4 / 638 17 / 638 8 / 638 
Panel size pooled pooled pooled  21,006 21,166 20,992 
Observations 7.470 7,518 7,467  28,476 28,684 28,459 
Within R-squared 0.865 0.884 0.798  0.749 0.745 0.716 
F-statistic 67.95*** 80.40*** 42.26***  57.71*** 61.30*** 30.43*** 
Significance level: * 10 percent   ** 5 percent   *** 1 percent 
All specifications include trade partner, chemical, and period fixed effects (in two-period specifications). Control and treatment groups are 
by individual chemical (ten-digit HS commodity code) and trade partner. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
Source: see text. 
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Table 7: Serial correlation robustness check for export values, individual chemical series 
 
DV: Import value ($ thou) Pre-treatment Period Results  Two-Period Results 
TRI listing year cohort 1994 1995 2000  1995 2000 
TRI listing for chemicals -292.055 
(264.647) 
-63.592 
(337.860) 
-98.250 
(411.502) 
 -360.577*** 
(69.503) 
-555.203*** 
(165.425) 
GDP per capita ($ thou) -0.617 
(13.120) 
-0.911 
(12.457) 
-4.927 
(10.629) 
 -0.614 
(10.829) 
79.668*** 
(25.423) 
TRI listing · GDP p.c. ($ thou) 134.739** 
(58.919) 
-44.171 
(42.200) 
-32.356 
(70.145) 
 -14.126 
(8.613) 
-7.551 
(11.685) 
GDP ($100 bil) 105.461 
(68.102) 
111.197* 
(64.999) 
0.002 
(36.106) 
 132.660*** 
(19.600) 
232.575*** 
(32.424) 
Terms of trade (year 2000=100) -2.395 
(4.007) 
-2.560 
(4.499) 
-5.951 
(7.120) 
 7.217*** 
(2.351) 
1.554** 
(0.760) 
OECD membership -134.748 
(158.555) 
-135.476 
(167.661) 
-103.804 
(186.555) 
 2050.226*** 
(419.205) 
775.849 
(491.394) 
       
Net TRI effect 129.151 
(269.390) 
-209.848 
(333.037) 
-226.532 
(362.879) 
 -505.452*** 
(89.737) 
-639.806*** 
(117.575) 
       
Treatment / Control groups 3 / 458 6 / 458 2 / 458  6 / 458 2 / 458 
Panel size pooled pooled pooled  35,664 35,384 
Observations 17,405 17,469 17,331  53,133 52,715 
Within R-squared 0.160 0.156 0.168  0.027 0.015 
F-statistic 7.16*** 7.00*** 7.54***  24.64*** 18.50*** 
Significance level: * 10 percent   ** 5 percent   *** 1 percent 
All specifications include trade partner, chemical, and period fixed effects (in two-period specifications). Control and 
treatment groups are by individual chemical (ten-digit HS commodity code) and trade partner. Robust standard errors are 
in parentheses. 
Source: see text. 
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Appendix: Description of traded chemicals added to TRI, 1989-2006 
 
 CAS Number NFPA Health 
Hazard 
Rating1 
Main import 
sources,  
1989-2006 
Main export 
destinations, 
1989-2006 
Bendiocarb: colorless or white odorless powder used as a pesticide. Mild eye and skin 
irritant. Exposure can cause rapid and severe carbamate poisoning with headache, 
dizziness, blurred vision, chest pain, vomiting, diarrhea, convulsion, coma and death. 
22781-23-3 - Taiwan, 
United 
Kingdom, 
Germany 
Belgium, 
Colombia, 
Saudi Arabia 
     
bromine: dark reddish-brown liquid or vapor used as a gasoline additive and in fire 
retardants, dyes, pharmaceuticals, fumigants, photographic chemicals, and water 
purification. Eye, skin, and respiratory irritant. Higher exposure can lead to fluid build-
up in lungs with severe shortness of breath. 
7726-95-6 3 Israel, United 
Kingdom, 
Canada 
Qatar, Canada, 
Japan 
     
Bromoxynil: colorless crystalline sold used as a herbicide. Eye and skin irritant and 
possible teratogen. Exposure may cause weight loss, fever, vomiting, headache, and 
death. 
1689-84-5 - France, United 
Kingdom, 
Italy 
n/a 
     
chlorodifluoromethane: colorless gas with ethereal odor used as refrigerant and 
solvent. Eye, skin, and respiratory irritant. Very high exposure can lead to headache, 
nausea, drowsiness, tremors, loss of consciousness, and death. 
75-45-6 - United 
Kingdom, 
France, Spain 
Saudi Arabia, 
Canada, 
Kuwait 
     
3,3-dichlorobenzidine dihydrochloride: gray to purple crystalline powder used to 
make dyes and to cure plastics. Eye, skin, and respiratory irritant and probable 
carcinogen. Exposure can lead to headache, dizziness, nausea, vomiting, liver and 
kidney damage, and cancers of the liver, breast, and bladder. 
612-83-9 - Japan, South 
Korea, India 
n/a 
     
dicyclopentadiene: colorless, crystalline powder with camphoric odor used in 
pesticides, paints, varnishes, and other chemicals. Eye, skin, and respiratory irritant. 
Acute effects include coughing and shortness of breath while chronic effects include 
kidney and lung damage. 
77-73-6 - Japan, Canada, 
Brazil 
n/a 
     
N,N-dimethylformamide: colorless to yellow liquid with fishy or ammonia odor used 
as a solvent or to make coatings, adhesives, and printing ink. Eye, skin, and respiratory 
irritant. May cause headache, dizziness, nausea, and damage to liver, kidneys, and 
nervous system. 
68-12-2 2 Canada, 
Brazil, Mexico 
n/a 
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Appendix (cont): Description of traded chemicals added to TRI, 1989-2006 
 
 CAS Number NFPA Health 
Hazard 
Rating1 
Main import 
sources,  
1989-2006 
Main export 
destinations, 
1989-2006 
dinitrobutyl phenol: reddish brown solid or viscous orange liquid used as a herbicide. 
Eye, skin, and respiratory irritant and probable carcinogen. Exposure may cause 
headache, fever, jaundice, damage to liver, kidney, and nervous system, and death. 
88-85-7 - United 
Kingdom, 
Japan 
n/a 
     
ethylidene dichloride: clear liquid with pleasant odor used in chemical manufacture 
and as a solvent, degreaser, and wetting agent. Eye, skin, and respiratory irritant. 
Exposure may cause nausea, diarrhea, headache, loss of consciousness, and damage to 
liver and kidneys. 
75-34-3 2 Canada, 
Germany, 
Brazil 
Taiwan, Japan, 
Netherlands 
     
Fenthion: colorless to brown liquid with faint odor used as an insecticide. Eye, skin, 
and respiratory irritant. Exposure can cause rapid, fatal organophosphate poisoning 
with headache, sweating, nausea, diarrhea, spasms, and death. 
55-38-9 - Japan, India, 
Denmark 
n/a 
     
fluorine: pale yellow or green gas or liquid with sharp odor used as rocket fuel or in 
other chemicals. Eye, skin, and respiratory irritant. Exposure can lead to fluid build-up 
in lungs, mottled teeth, nosebleeds, nausea, and diarrhea. 
7782-41-4 - China, Japan, 
South Korea 
Canada, 
Germany, 
Taiwan 
     
formic acid: colorless liquid with strong odor used in textile dyeing and finishing, 
leather treatment, and other chemicals. Eye, skin, and respiratory irritant. Exposure can 
lead to fluid build-up in lungs, headache, nausea, and kidney damage. 
64-18-6 3 United 
Kingdom, 
Germany, 
Belgium 
Belgium, 
Germany, 
Ireland 
     
alpha-hexachlorocyclohexane: white, yellow, or brown powder in flake or crystals 
with a musty odor used as an insecticide. Eye, skin, and respiratory irritant and 
probable carcinogen. Exposure may cause headache, nausea, dizziness, seizures, and 
convulsions. 
319-84-6 - France, India, 
Romania 
Israel, 
Bulgaria, 
Lithuania 
     
lithium carbonate: white, odorless powder used in ceramic glazing, varnishes, and 
lubricants as well as pharmaceuticals. Eye, skin, and respiratory irritant and teratogen. 
May cause fluid build-up in lungs, headache, seizures, coma, and damage to thyroid, 
heart, and kidneys. 
554-13-2 - Chile, 
Argentina, 
New Zealand 
Germany, 
Japan, United 
Kingdom 
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Appendix (cont): Description of traded chemicals added to TRI, 1989-2006 
 
 CAS Number NFPA Health 
Hazard 
Rating1 
Main import 
sources,  
1989-2006 
Main export 
destinations, 
1989-2006 
malonitrile: white powder used in chemical manufacturing and gold processing. Eye, 
skin, and respiratory irritant. May cause fluid build-up in lungs, headache, nausea, 
numbness, lethargy, tremors, and convulsions as well as liver and kidney damage. 
109-77-3 - Switzerland, 
China, 
Germany 
n/a 
     
methoxone: white crystalline powder used as a herbicide. Severe eye and skin irritant 
and possible carcinogen. Exposure can lead to slurred speech, spasms, low-blood 
pressure, loss of consciousness, and damage to kidneys, liver, and other organs.  
94-74-6 2 Netherlands, 
United 
Kingdom, 
Germany 
n/a 
     
monuron: white crystalline powder with faint odor used as a herbicide. Eye, skin, and 
respiratory irritant. May lead to nausea, vomiting, diarrhea, headache, emphysema, 
weight loss, and damage to liver and kidneys. 
150-68-5 - Israel, Austria, 
Hungary 
n/a 
     
paraquat dichloride: colorless to yellow, odorless solid used as a herbicide. Severe 
eye, skin, and respiratory irritant and probable carcinogen. Exporsure may lead to fluid 
build-up in lungs, nausea, vomiting, diarrhea, and damage to liver, kidneys, and heart. 
1910-42-5 - Japan, 
Guatemala, 
Taiwan 
n/a 
     
sodium nitrite: yellowish white and odorless crystalline powder used in metal 
treatment, color fixatives, food preservatives, and pharmaceuticals. Eye, skin, and 
respiratory irritant. May cause headache, blue lips, nausea, vomiting, diarrhea, 
collapse, and death. 
7632-00-0 - Germany, 
Poland, United 
Kingdom 
n/a 
     
tetrabromobisphenol A: colorless to yellow solid used as a flame retardant. May 
cause damage to thyroid. 
79-94-7 - Istael, Japan, 
China 
n/a 
     
tetracycline hydrochloride: yellow, odorless powder used in pharmaceuticals. 
Exposure may cause anorexia, nausea, diarrhea, black tongue, tooth discoloration, 
jaundice, and damage to kidney and liver. 
64-75-5 - China, 
Portugal, Italy 
Italy, Japan, 
Belgium 
     
vanadate: white powder used in chemical reactions. Eye, skin, and respiratory irritant. 
May cause headache, coughing, diarrhea, green tongue, and tremors. 
13721-39-6 2 South Africa, 
Germany, 
France 
n/a 
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Appendix (cont): Description of traded chemicals added to TRI, 1989-2006 
 
 CAS Number NFPA Health 
Hazard 
Rating1 
Main import 
sources,  
1989-2006 
Main export 
destinations, 
1989-2006 
vanadium chloride: reddish-brown, viscous liquid used in textile dyeing and other 
chemical compounds. Eye, skin, and respiratory irritant. May cause fluid build-up in 
lungs, green tongue, and liver damage. 
7632-51-1 2 France, China, 
Japan 
n/a 
     
vanadium chloride oxide: yellow liquid with sharp odor used as a chemical catalyst 
and dye manufacture. Eye, skin, and respiratory irritant. May cause bronchitis, anemia, 
and kidney damage. 
7727-18-6 - Japan, United 
Kingdom 
n/a 
     
vanadium hydride: solid used in textile dyeing and neutron moderation during atomic 
reactions. Eye, skin, respiratory, and gastrointestinal irritant. May cause headache, 
dizziness, fatigue, nausea, loss of consciousness, and death. 
13966-93-3 1 South Africa, 
Gernay, 
Russia 
n/a 
     
vanadium oxide: yellow or brown, odorless crystalline solid used as a chemical 
catalyst, photography developer, and intermediate in pesticides and dyes. Eye, skin, 
and respiratory irritant and probably carcinogen. Exposure can cause headache, 
dizziness, nausea, fluid build-up in lungs, and damage to liver and kidneys. 
12036-21-4 2 South Africa, 
Austria, 
United 
Kingdom 
Spain, Austria, 
Sweden 
     
vanadium pentoxide: see vanadium oxide 1314-62-1 3 South Africa, 
China, Russia 
Belgium, 
Germany, 
Brazil 
     
vanadium sulfate: pale blue, odorless powder used in textile dyes, glass and ceramic 
coloring, and other chemical manufacture. Eye, skin, and respiratory irritant. May 
cause fluid build-up in lungs, green tongue, and damage to liver and kidneys. 
 
27774-13-6 - South Africa, 
India, 
Germany 
n/a 
1 NFPA Health Hazard Rating: 1 - Materials that under emergency conditions can cause significant irritation; 2 - Materials that under emergency conditions 
can cause temporary incapacitation or residual injury; 3 - Materials that under emergicy conditions can cause serious or permanent injury; 4 - Materials that 
under emergency conditions can be lethal; see NFPA (2012). 
Source: State of New Jersey Department of Health, website: http://web.doh.state.nj.us/rtkhsfs/factsheets.aspx; US Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration, website: http://www.osha.gov/chemicaldata/; US National Library of Medicine, website: http://toxnet.nlm.nih.gov/cgi-
bin/sis/htmlgen?HSDB; and author's calculations. 
     
 
